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I draw on my aggregate utility account of how to choose in the face of what Edna Ullmann-Margalit (2006) calls big decisions, that is, decisions that lead to these personally transformative experiences (Chapters 6 and 7, Pettigrew 2019). In this paper, I take up the challenge of finding an alternative test. In those cases, the nudgee will judge the nudge to be legitimate after it has taken place, but only because their values have changed as a result of the nudge. ) cases in which we are nudged to make a decision that leads to what Paul calls a personally transformative experience, that is, one that results in our values changing (Paul 2014). Paul and Sunstein (Paul & Sunstein ms) raised a concern about this test: it often seems to give the wrong answer in (. When is it legitimate for a government to ‘nudge’ its citizens, in the sense described by Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein (Thaler & Sustein 2008)? In their original work on the topic, Thaler and Sunstein developed the ‘as judged by themselves‘ (or AJBT) test to answer this question (5, Thaler & Sunstein 2008). I present an experiment supporting the polarizing effect of cognitive search, and then use models and simulations to show how such ambiguous evidence can help explain two of the core causes of polarization: confirmation bias and the group polarization effect. This process is not only theoretically possible, but also empirically plausible.
#Rational application developer search resorce shortcut series
) A series of such rational updates can lead to polarization that is predictable, profound, and persistent. And ours often is: the process of cognitive search-searching a cognitively-accessible space for an item of a particular profile-yields ambiguous evidence that can predictably polarize beliefs, despite being expected to make them more accurate. Bayesians will predictably polarize iff their evidence is ambiguous.
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That fact is often thought to demonstrate human irrationality. Empirical studies suggest that this is so when evidence is ambiguous. Predictable polarization is everywhere: we can often predict how people’s opinions-including our own-will shift over time. Our analysis forms a bridge between rationality and logic, and enables logical talk about multi-attitude psychology. Addressing John Broome's enquiry into the achievability of rationality through reasoning, we characterize the extent to which explicit reasoning can help one become more 'logical', i.e., acquire consistent, complete, or closed attitudes, respectively. ) our three logical conditions and standard rationality conditions. We establish a formal correspondence between (. They generalise the classic logical conditions on beliefs towards multiple attitudes, but contrast with standard rationality conditions such as transitivity for preferences, modus ponens for binary beliefs, additivity for probabilistic beliefs, and non-akrasia for intentions. We introduce three 'logical' conditions on attitudes: consistency, completeness, and closedness. We construe rationality as coherence between one's attitudes, e.g., one's beliefs, values, and intentions. We present an abstract model of rationality theories that focuses on structural properties of attitudes.